Abstract-To facilitate more efficient control, massive amounts of sensors or measurement devices will be deployed in the Smart Grid. Data collection then becomes non-trivial. In this paper, we study the scenario where a data collector is responsible for collecting data from multiple measurement devices, but only some of them can communicate with the data collector directly. Others have to rely on other devices to relay the data. We first develop a communication protocol so that the data reported by each device is protected again honest-but-curious data collector and devices. To reduce the time to collect data from all devices within a certain security level, we formulate our approach as an integer linear programming problem. As the problem is NP-hard, obtaining the optimal solution in a large network is not very feasible. We thus develop an approximation algorithm to solve the problem. We test the performance of our algorithm using real topologies. The results show that our algorithm successfully identifies good solutions within reasonable amount of time.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the significant hallmarks of the Smart Grid (SG) initiative is the pervasive data sensing to facilitate a more efficient control. While the existing Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) system already collects data from various sensors, the scale and scope of the data collection in the SG are expected to pose new challenges. Applications of data sensing in the SG include conditional and structural monitoring of Distributed Energy Resources and renewables in the generation; State-of-Charge monitoring; substation, transformer, underground and overhead lines in the transmission and distribution; and collection of information from smart meters in the Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) [1] .
In addition to the emerging and new sensing in the SG, data collection from the legacy telemetric devices widely deployed in the field needs to be accommodated as part of the infrastructure, at the very least, in the transitional period. An example of such legacy telemetric collection need is provided in [2] . In this scenario, a mobile data collector (DC) moves along a road, or a certain path, to collect data from measurement devices (MDs). It can only connect directly to the MDs that are within DC's proximity. We call the MDs that can talk to the DC directly root MDs. Those MDs that are outside the communication range of the DC have to send data to the DC through root MDs in a multihop manner. Figure 1 presents a simple example where only root MDs (MD1, MD2, MD3) can talk to the DC directly. Other remote MDs should send their data to one of the root MDs. Note that the underlying data collection paradigm of the aforementioned case is present in many other emerging sensing and measurement scenarios [1] , [3] , especially when sequential data collection is needed over a multihop communications topology. To reduce the number of messages needed for the whole data collection, we propose generating several disjoint trees, each rooted at a certain MD, such that the trees reach all MDs. Fig. 2 shows an example, where bold edges show the trees formed from the roots.
In this paper, we are interested in secure, scalable, and optimized data collection in the SG. Our objective is to reduce the total data collection time while ensuring the confidentiality of the data. We encrypt data in a way that while allowing the relaying MDs to verify the message integrity, they cannot read the content under the honest-but-curious model. The data collection time is reduced through identifying data collection trees that have minimum sum of depths. We develop an optimization problem for the secure data collection, which is NP-Hard, and then develop an approximation algorithm.
The rest is organized as follows: Sec. II presents the related work. Tree-based secure data collection is detailed in Sec. III. Sec. IV develops the optimization problem and solution together with an approximation algorithm. Simulation results are given in Sec. V. Sec. VI concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
To the best of our knowledge, confidential data collection with integrity validation by means of forming disjoint trees to minimize the total collection time has not been studied in the literature. We dissect our problem into three constituents in order to present a discussion of the partially related work: (1) Multi-sink data collection in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) and opportunistic networks [4] , (2) Tree or cluster formation, and (3) Secure data collection.
There is some similarity in our formulation to data collection via mobile relay nodes [5] , except that the objective of our approach is not energy efficiency Data collection by means of mobile sinks [6] is somewhat related in the sense that we are looking to choose the root of trees to relay the data to. The optimization part of our problem is similar to the Base Station Problem from [7] where the problem of positioning data collecting nodes in a WSN is studied as a maximum flow problem with the objective of finding the optimal data rate. The NP-completeness proof of the problem is also given in [7] . While retaining the complexity 1 , our problem is about the minimization of total time of the data collection and incorporates the security aspect. The tree formation of our approach connotes clustering algorithms, especially in WSNs [9] . However, unlike the goals of WSN clustering on node reachability and network longevity, we focus on security and data collection time minimization.
Finally, as for the security of the data collection task, there are two major approaches: One is to ensure the protection of the data content directly without regard to the data semantics. An approach presented in [10] is based on symmetric cryptography to provide data confidentiality and authentication between sensors and the base station. [11] describes a protocol for DC to collect data from an MD, but direct communication between DC and MD is assumed. Another category for providing security exploits the aggregate statistics of the sensed data, such as summation, average, minimum, maximum, etc. These approaches take advantage of in-network data processing (also referred to as aggregation) to induce some obfuscating operations on the transmitted data [12] - [20] . Our problem formulation does not assume any statistical property for in-network processing.
III. SECURE DATA COLLECTION VIA TREES

A. Overview
A Power Operator (PO) delegates a DC to collect data from a certain number of MDs. We assume each entity in the system possesses a pair of public and private key as longterm secrets. We denote the public key and private key of node A as A + and A − , respectively. Before an MD is installed in the field, it is configured with its own public/private key pair and the public key of PO, but not the public key of DC. Our architecture does not require an MD to know the public keys of its neighbors, either. Apart from the keys, all entities are also configured with Diffie-Hellman (DH) parameters g and p for shared key establishment 2 . PO, DC, and MDs all agree to use the following basic cryptographic functions. 1) PKE(K, M) : Public key encryption on message M using key K 2) SKE(K, M) : Symmetric key encryption on M using K 3) SIG(A, M) : Signature of M by A (created using A − ) 4) HASH(K, M) : Compute the keyed-hash of M using key K
The security objective of the data collection is to protect the data reported by each MD such that only the PO can read the data generated by MDs. That is, even though the data reported has to be relayed by other MDs and the DC, these MDs and DC should not be able to read it. To achieve this efficiently, data should be encrypted by a shared key between a certain MD and the PO using symmetric key cryptography. We adopt the DH mechanism to develop the shared keys. On the other hand, to allow intermediate MDs to perform integrity checks, all the MDs within the same disjoint tree share a Group Key GK (to be explained below) with PO and DC.
We now briefly describe the whole procedure of data collection. First, the PO determines the disjoint trees to be used for data collection. Then, it provides the tree information and the necessary key information to the DC. The DC then talks to each root MD along its path to collect data. Root MD sends the key information along each branch on its tree to collect data. After it receives data from all MDs in its tree, it sends the data to DC.
B. Data Collection on a Branch
We first describe a simple situation that data is collected along a certain branch on the tree. We then describe the data collection of a whole tree. Fig. 3 presents how DC collects data on a tree branch spanning from MD 1 , the root MD, to MD 2 , and then MD 3 . Let the branch be MD 1 → MD 2 → . . .MD l , where MD 1 is the root MD. The public DH key of PO is g c (mod p is dropped for brevity), and the group key is GK. The key information created by the PO is denoted by C = g c ||GK, where || represents the concatenation operation. Each MD on the branch must receive C to develop a shared key with the PO. The detailed procedure of data collection is as follows:
To protect C from eavesdroppers, C is encrypted using the public keys of the MDs. As only the PO knows the public keys of all the MDs, PKE(MD + k ,C) for 1 ≤ k ≤ l are created by PO and sent to DC, which will be discussed in Section III-C. MD 1 authenticates C by verifying the signature SIG(PO,C). MD 1 verifies the legitimacy of DC by verifying SIG(DC,C). MD 1 then signs C using its public key and sends the signature together with other information to the next MD along the branch.
Note that as MD 1 also sends MD + 1 to MD 2 so that MD 2 does not need to know any public key of any MD before the communication. When MD 2 receives the message, it performs similar operations as MD 1 that it authenticates C and MD 1 . It 2014 IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications then passes the key information to the next MD (more details will be provided in Section III-C).
Intermediate MDs on a tree branch keep forwarding the key information to the next MD after retrieving GK and g c from C.
MD l is the last MD on the branch. After verifying C, it prepares the reported data. It first generates its own DH half key g d l and develops the shared key between itself and the PO, which is g cd l . Let DATA l be the data encrypted and integrity protected using g cd l . MD l then sends DATA l to MD l−1 for relaying to DC and finally to PO. To allow MD l−1 to perform authentication check on DATA l , MD l computes the hash of DATA l using g d l . MD l should also let MD l−1 and the PO knows what g d l is. Let message
M l contains the DH half key and the encrypted data to be delivered to the PO.
. It then can authenticate the message by verifying the hash. Note that although MD l−1 knows g c and g d l , according to the property of DH protocol, MD l−1 still cannot compute g cd l to decrypt DATA l . Thus, DATA l remains secret to MD k for all k = 1,..., l − 1 and the DC. After verifying the message, MD l−1 prepares its own encrypted data DATA l−1 and sends both DATA l and DATA l−1 to MD l−2 together with the required key information.
MD l−2 processes the message in a similar manner as MD l−1 does. Finally, MD 1 would receive a message from MD 2 that contains all the data from MD 2 to MD l . It can then prepare a message that contains all the data on the branch for the DC. 7) MD 1 → DC: MD
To facilitate a root MD to collect data for its tree, it has to know which neighbors belong to its tree. The root MD also needs to inform its children of their children. In other words, the tree structure has to be embedded in the message from the DC to the root MD, and passed along to the MDs on the tree. C = g c ||GK has to be encrypted using the public key of each MD on the tree. We use PKE(MD + i ,C) for all MD i on the tree to represent the tree. Let E(i) = PKE(MD i ,C), and let T (i) be the tree representation rooted at MD i . We further let MD ch 1 , . . . , MD ch m be the children of MD i if it is not a leaf. The representation is as follows:
Refer to the tree rooted at MD 2 in Fig. 2 ,
When MD i receives T (i), it can retrieve C from E(i). It can also identify its children to forward key information. Let MD j be a child of MD i , it sends MD + i ||SIG(PO,C)||SIG(MD i ,C)||T ( j) to MD j . An MD should wait for all its children to report data before sending its data to its parent. Data reporting does not have to follow the tree structure. A parent MD can simply append all M k of descendant MD k together. For example, MD 2 in Fig. 2 can send DC MD
D. Completing the Protocol
We now complete the protocol by describing the communication between the PO and the DC. Fig. 4 illustrates the information exchange. They first use the DH protocol to establish a shared secret K to secure the subsequent conversation. PO picks the group keys to be used. The tree structure and the key information are then encrypted using K. Suppose there are k root MDs, MD r 1 , MD r 2 ,..., MD r k . PO can use different DH half keys and group keys to develop shared keys with the MDs on different trees. Let the DH half key and the group key for the tree rooted at MD h i be g c i and GK i , respectively. We further let C i = g c i ||GK i . For root MD MD h i , PO sends SKE(K,C i ||SIG(PO,C i ))||T (h i ) to DC. DC can then verify the signature for each C i and talk to the root MDs to collect data as described earlier. After all data are collected, DC encrypts M j for each MD j it collects using K. Note that
||DATA j , which belongs to the tree of MD i , contains enough information for the PO to retrieve and verify the data.
E. Security Discussion and Its Complexity
In our protocol, the confidentiality of the data is ensured through the Diffie-Hellman keys. The DH half keys are transmitted under encryption. Eavesdroppers cannot read them. The data remains confidential to the honest-but-curious DC and intermediate MDs as well because, although they can read the public DH keys exchanged between the PO and the MD, they cannot establish the DH key themselves. Key information from the root to the leaves are authenticated through signatures, while data from the leaves to the root are authenticated through the hashes in a hop-by-hop manner. Although a tampering on data can be detected by the PO eventually, by authenticating the data in a hop-by-hop manner, tampering can be identified 2014 IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications early so that network resources would not have been spent on transmitting the tampered data from the leaf to the PO. Our protocol is thus secure from both active and passive attacks when the keys are not leaked. (We consider the risk of leaking the group key in our problem formulation in Sec. IV-A).
We now study the computational complexity of an MD. We only consider public key and DH operations since symmetric key and hash operations are not expensive. The leaf MD receives one message from its parent and sends one message to its parent in each data collection cycle. It has to decrypt the key information and verify two signatures for the message received. To prepare the reply, it generates a DH half key and signs it. Five operations are needed in total for a leaf node. Similar operations are needed for the messages to and from the parent for each non-leaf MD. To send messages to its children, an MD has to sign the key information. For each reply from a child, it has to verify the signature of the half key provided by the child. Therefore, the total number of operations a non-leaf MD needs to perform is 6 + number of children.
IV. COLLECTION TREE FORMATION
A. Problem Description
In this section, we describe how PO constructs the disjoint data collection trees on the network connectivity graph G of MDs. Since the PO has complete information of the topology, graph G, a connected vertex set of all MDs, is known a priori. We use set M = {1, 2, ···} to denote the index set of these MDs. Furthermore, if there is a direct connectivity between two MDs then an undirected edge exists between them in graph G. Furthermore, we define the set of all MDs that can potentially be selected as the root MDs candidate set, and we use R to denote the set of indices of these candidate root MDs. The largest possible candidate set consists of all the MDs that can be physically within the communication range of the DC when it is traveling along the predefined data collection path. For example, in Fig. 1 , R = {1, 2, 3}.
Our objective is to minimize the sum of the data collection time over all trees. We further assume identical link delays. Then, we can use the depth of a data collection tree to represent the time needed to collect data from this particular tree and the summation of the depths over all constructed trees to represent the overall data collection time.
Apart from the time to collect data, we also consider the security level of the group key. As the MDs may not be in a very secure physical environment, there is a risk of leaking the group key. If the group key is stolen, the attacker can decrypt SKE(GK, g d k ) in M k to obtain g d k and create the correct hash of fake data. Although the PO can finally detect the data were not legitimate, network resource will be wasted in transmitting the message. Assume that every MD i (i ∈ M) leaks the group key with probability p i . Then the probability that the group key of a tree T is leaked is P leak (T ) = 1 − ∏ i:MD i ∈T (1 − p i ).
To ensure the security level of every constructed tree T , we limit P leak (T ) to be no larger than some predefined threshold. We assume identical p i 's. Then, if we limit the group key leaking probability to be no larger than some threshold value P threshold , we have:
In other words, the cardinality of every constructed tree should satisfy
As detailed in the next subsection, we formulate the optimization problem with a Min − Sum − Max objective to minimize the summation of the depths over all constructed trees with the aforementioned security constraint.
B. Mathematical Formulation
We state the optimal collection tree formation (CTF) problem into a binary integer programming formulation as follows:
N i : the set of neighbors of MD i . P k i j : the k th shortest path from MD i to MD j in graph G. There can be multiple equal length shortest paths between any pair of MDs in graph G. For example, in Fig. 1 two shortest Fig. 1 because two shortest paths exist between MD 8 and MD 1 , we have K 81 = {1, 2}. L i j : number of MDs in the shortest paths between MD i and MD j . In the example in Fig. 1 , we have L 18 = 3. With Eq. 1, N threshold : maximum number of MDs allowed in one tree.
We associate a binary variable x k i j with every shortest path P k i j between MD i (∀i ∈ M) and MD j (∀ j ∈ R). For all MD i 's out of the candidate set and MD j 's in the candidate set, that is ∀i ∈ M \ R and ∀ j ∈ R, we have
s data is not collected along P k i j to MD j Furthermore, for all MD i belonging to the candidate set, that is ∀i ∈ R, we have x 1 ii = 1 if MD i is selected as a root; otherwise, x 1 ii = 0. In the objective function (2), max i∈M ∑ k∈K i j x k i j L i j for some fixed j ∈ R represents the depth of the tree rooted at candidate root MD j . Furthermore, max i∈M ∑ k∈K i j x k i j L i j = 0 if MD j is not chosen as the root of any collection tree. Therefore, by summing over ∀ j ∈ R, we have the objective function (2) representing the total depth over all constructed trees.
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The inequality constraints (5) ensure that any MD i can send data to MD j over path P k i j only if one of MD i 's neighbors MD m chooses to send data to MD j over P l m j , a sub-path of path P k i j . Refer to Fig. 1 . In a word, the single path constraints (4) and the subpath constraints (5) together ensure that we construct multiple disjoint trees rooted at all or a subset of the MDs in the candidate set. Furthermore, the security constraints (3) further ensure that the number of nodes in every constructed tree is no larger than the threshold.
C. Solution and Analysis
To solve CTF, we firstly transform it into the standard format by rewriting (2) as follows: (7) and (8), together with constraints (3) to (6), form the modified CTF. The modified-CTF problem is equivalent to the original CTF problem in terms of the optimal objective function value. Nevertheless, the mixed-integer programming problem is an NP-hard problem. Thus, we propose to use an approximation algorithm by means of a linear relaxation based iterative rounding (LR-IR) [21] as shown in Algorithm 1. It is In our simulation, we use the SG data set for Washington, DC [22] , which contains the exact positions of all the utility poles in the city. We extract the positions of 300 utility poles from two portions of the map, as shown in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 .
Specifically, there are 8 stars in both figures representing MDs in the candidate root set. In Fig. 5 , we assume that the DC is traveling along the southernmost street. In Fig. 6 , the DC is assumed to be traveling along the westernmost street. Then, we pick evenly distributed 8 MDs along the two streets to be the candidate root sets. Furthermore, we assume that MDs communicate with each other wirelessly with an identical communication range of 100m. Also, topology II has a large MD density(826/km 2 ) than than topology I (722/km 2 ). We used GUROBI solver [23] for our simulations.
In our simulation, we construct a scenario by choosing |M| MDs nearest to the reference streets. For example, in topology I, 50 MDs that are nearest to the southernmost street in Fig. 5 are selected to construct the scenario. In Fig. 7 , we compare the total depth of the constructed trees in scenarios with different number of MDs generated by three algorithms: The optimal algorithm is the solution from GUROBI or the modified-CTF problem. The approximation algorithm refers to Algorithm 1. In the random tree formation algorithm, every MD randomly selects a neighbor which has been included in a tree to be its parent. Also, in Fig. 7 , two cases are considered in both topologies, namely N threshold = 40% × |M| and N threshold = 80% × |M|. For example, if we assume that every MD leaks the group key with probability p = 0.01 and |M| = 100, then N threshold = 40% × |M| means we set the threshold probability
In Fig. 7 , our approximation algorithm yields a total tree depth which is much smaller than that of the random tree formation algorithm while staying fairly close to the optimal value. As the maximum tree size (N threshold ) increases, both the optimal and the approximation algorithm tend to yield decreasing values of the total tree depth. This observation captures the trade-off between efficiency and security of our optimization formulation. We will further show it in Fig. 9 .
The comparison of the completion time (in terms of seconds) of the optimal algorithm and the approximation algorithm with different numbers of MDs is provided in Table I . We can readily observe that completion time of the optimal algorithm increases exponentially with the number of MDs. In contrast, our approximation algorithm has much lower completion time.
Furthermore, from Table I , we observe that when |M| = 100, the optimal algorithm already has to take more than 6000s to complete. This indicates that when solving the modified-CTF problem for a network of more than 100 MDs, it is better to turn to our approximation algorithm. Hence, we carry out simulation in scenarios with up to 300 MDs whereby our approximation algorithm terminates in reasonable time period.
From Fig. 8 , we can observe that the approximation algorithm outperforms the baseline random tree formation algo- rithm in terms of the total tree depth when the number of MDs is larger than 100.
In Fig. 9 , we fix the number of MDs to be |M| = 50 and vary the maximum percentage of MDs in one tree, from 20% to 70%. As this ratio increases, we see an increasing trend of the average constructed tree size and a decreasing trend of the total tree depth. This observation reflects the trade-off between efficiency and security of data collection inherently in our problem formulation. More specifically, if we allow MDs to form trees with larger sizes then the total depth of constructed trees tends to be smaller.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we develop a secure and efficient protocol to collect data from measurement devices (MD) in a multi-hop manner through a mobile data collector (DC). MDs report data via trees rooted at the MDs that have direct communication with the DC. We formulate the secure and optimal tree construction problem as an integer linear programming, and develop an approximation algorithm to compute a solution.
The simulations conducted using real topologies reflect that our algorithm performs well and efficiently.
